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SCHENKER v. MOODHE
Doubtless the same attitude which underlies the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments to the Federal Constitution led to
the enactment of the Maryland statute known as the Bouse
Act.23 This provides:
"No evidence in the trial of misdemeanors shall be
deemed admissible when the same shall have been pro-
cured by, through, or in consequence of any illegal
search or seizure, or of any search and seizure pro-
hibited by the Declaration of Rights of this State; nor
shall any evidence in such cases be admissible if pro-
cured by, through or in consequence of a search and
seizure, the effect of the admission of which would be
to compel one to give evidence against himself in a
criminal case".
While, therefore, before the passage of the above act,
evidence obtained or secured by virtue of an illegal search,
with or without warrant, otherwise admissible, was per-
mitted in this state, it follows that since the passage of
the act, such evidence in cases of misdemeanor is no longer
admissible. In the instant case the Court of Appeals stated
that the evidence procured is not inadmissible under the
statute for the obvious reason that the statute makes. no
reference to the interception of wire communications. 24
REQUIREMENT OF DELIVERY IN GIFTS
OF PERSONALTY
Schenker v. Moodhel
Plaintiff-appellee brought this bill in equity against the
administrator of the estate of one Coleman, to compel the
surrender of property alleged to have been given her by the
decedent. Plaintiff had assisted the decedent on several
occasions before his last illness, and the decedent had ex-
pressed an intention to reward her. When the decedent
realized that death was imminent, he told the plaintiff that
he had purchased a cemetery lot and that she would find a
23 Md. Code Supp., Art. 35, Sec. 4 A.
21 For a treatment of the Bouse Act generally, see Note, Admi8sibility
of Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Search and Seizure (1938) 2 Md. L.
Rev. 147.
1 200 A. 727 (Md. 1938). For the same litigation, on a separate bill of
complaint and appeal, see Moodhe v. Schenker, 4 A. (2nd) 453 (Md. 1939).
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receipt for it among his papers. He then directed her to the
places where he had secreted his papers, bank books and
other valuables. He told her that she would find the number
of his safe deposit box among the papers, and that she
should hold the bank book, papers and other valuables, as
well as the contents of the safe deposit box, for the purpose
of paying his funeral and other expenses, and that the bal-
ance was to be her own. Upon being taken from the house
to the hospital, from which he did not return, the decedent
told the plaintiff to get his keys. from the pocket of his
trousers in his room. Upon warning of the contagious char-
acter of the disease of the decedent, the plaintiff did not
take possession of any of the property, but it was turned
over to the administrator.
The Court of Appeals declared that, in order for the
plaintiff to recover, the facts must support either a gift
causa mortis, a gift inter vivos, or a gift by way of a declara-
tion in trust, and held that since the plaintiff did not take
possession of the property during the life of the decedent,
there could be no gift causa mortis or inter vivos, as in both
of these an essential element is. the delivery of the property
intended to be transferred, during the life of the donor.
The Court pointed out that although delivery is essential
to a valid gift, it may be either actual or constructive, but
to be a valid constructive delivery, it must not only be ac-
companied by words sufficient to show a donative intent, but
must be of such a character as, completely to divest the donor
of dominion and control over the donation and to place it
"wholly under the donee's power." The Court distin-
guished the principal case from the case of Brooks v. Mit-
chell2 simply upon the ground that in that case the intended
donee took possession of the property before the death of
the donor, saying that in the principal case the donor could
have taken possession and had control of the property up
to the time of his death. It will be noticed that this leaves
the completion of the gift entirely up to the actions, of the
donee, and it is possible to argue, especially in the principal
case, that the property was here "wholly under the donee 's
power. " I
Pointing out the development of the law from the early
common law requirement of actual manual tradition to
transfer absolute property in a chattel' to the present rules
163 Md. 1, 161 A. 261, 84 A. L. R. 547 (1932).
'Irons v. Smailpiece, 3 B. & AId. 551 (1819), to the effect that no parol
gift of a chattel capable of manual tradition is valid without delivery
thereof by the donor to the donee.
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allowing constructive and symbolical delivery, commenta-
tors4 have contended that there is a tendency on the part
of the courts to relax the requirement of delivery in gifts of
personal property. The first relaxation of the requirement
of actual manual tradition came in the case where the chat-
tel, because of its size, was not capable of actual delivery.'
Delivery of the effective means of acquiring or coming to
the use of the subject of the gift was held to suffice. Fur-
ther relaxation of the requirement of delivery was accepted
where the article, although ,smalll in size, and hence sus-
ceptible of manual delivery, was never-the-less not pres-
ent.' Thus both size and location of the subject of the gift
are considered by the Court in reaching its conclusion upon
the existence of a constructive delivery. One of the most
familiar examples of this latter type of gift, where the
subject of the gift is capable of actual manual delivery, but
is not present at the time of the gift is where the contents
of a safe deposit box are given to a donee, the only delivery
being the delivery of the key to the box.7 One commenta-
tor" points out that some of the cases have gone so far as to
permit a constructive delivery when the subject of the gift
was present and capable of manual delivery. An example
of this is an Oregon case9 where a father pointed out to his
daughter the places on his farm where money was buried
and made a positive declaration of gift of the money to her.
She did not remove the money from the places where it was
buried until after her father's death. The Court found
that there was a valid gift. A similar result was reached
in regard to bank stock in a safe, where the donor intrusted
the donee with the combination of the safe, but the donee
did not take possession before the death of the donee.10
Professor Roberts1 submits tfhat the cases show the direc-
tion in which the law on the subject is developing and that
'Note, Relazation of the Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Personal
Property (1937) 6 Fordh. L. Rev. 106; Roberts, The Necessity of Delivery
in Making Gifts (1926) 32 W. Va. L. Q. 313.
5 Jones v. Selby, Prec. Ch. 300, 24 Eng. Repr. 143 (1710); Ward v.
Turner, 2 Ves. Sr. 431, 28 Eng. Repr. 275 (1752).
6 Newman v. Bost, 122 N. C. 524, 29 S. E. 848 (1898).
7 Maryland requires that the donor surrender complete control. In In re
Bauernschmidt's Estate, 97 Md. 35, 54 A. 637 (1903), B rented a safe deposit
box in the names of himself and wife, as joint tenants, the survivor to
have access to the box, and each was given a key. The Court held that
there was no completed gift as there was no complete delivery of possession
and dominion of the contents of the box.
9 Note, 6 Fordh. L. Rev. 106, supra n. 4.
Waite v. Grubbe, 43 Ore. 406, 73 Pac. 206 (1903).1 0 Teague v. Abbott, 51 Ind. App. 604, 100 N. E. 27 (1912).
Op. cit. supra n. 4.
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it is only a question of time until the courts will sustain
gifts at least between the alleged donee and third parties
where there is not even a semblance of symbolical delivery
but where they are satisfied that the alleged donor intended
to make a gift. In support of this proposition he suggests
that one might argue that in all probability the requirement
of delivery in the case of gifts was largely evidential, and
that today, since the parties themselves may generally be
called as witnesses and many other means of proof are. now
possible that were formerly forbidden, the courts, if they
are fully satisfied that there was a gift, are not going to
allow the ancient requirement of delivery to stand in the
way of their sustaining the gift.
On the other hand, a leading authority 12 on the subject
of gifts strongly contends that the requirement of delivery
should not be discarded as. arbitrary and outmoded, but that
it should be preserved as resting on the basis of sound
public policy. In the requirement of delivery, Professor.
Mechem sees a valuable aid to the preservation of three
desiderata in the transaction of gifts. First, by requiring
that a gift shall not take effect until delivery, the donor is
protected from making ill-considered and impulsive dona-
tions. The manual tradition of the subject o'f the gift pre-
sents vividly to the donor the fact that he is relinquishing
all ownership and enjoyment of his, property in favor of
the donee. Secondly, the actual delivery of possession pre-
sents strong concrete evidence that the donor really in-
tended to part with dominion over the goods. It corrobo-
rates, the words of gift, which might otherwise be misunder-
stood or poorly remembered. Thirdly, the possession
given to the donee fuTnishes, him with positive and concrete
evidence of his assertion that the donor made to him a
gift of the property in question. 18
Whatever the direction other courts are taking, the
Maryland court appears to brook no further relaxation of
the requirement of delivery. In the principal case, quot-
ing from Whalen v. Milholland,"4 the Court says:
"'These deathbed donations, to be upheld, ought to
be above question or suspicion at all times, but more
especially when they render inoperative, as they would
in this case, the provisions of a will made at a calmer
and more collected moment. The evidence to support
12 Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Ghatte18 (1926) 21
Ill. L. Rev. 341, 457, 568.
11 See also Brown, Personal Property, Sec. 38.
1 89 Md. 199, 43 A. 45, 44 L. R. A. 208 (1899).
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them ought to be clear and free from uncertainty, for
the temptation to seize upon disjointed sentences, ut-
tered when the physical frame, is prostrated and the
mental faculties are failing, and to convert them into a
deliberate gift of the bulk of a dying person's estate,
might be too often yielded to, under the influence of in-
terest or the promptings of avarice, and produce most
grievous wrongs. The facility with which such gifts
sometimes are proved is suggestive of great caution in
weighing the evidence adduced to sustain them. To
doubt them ought to be to deny them. "Around every
other disposition of the property of the dead the legis-
lature has thrown safeguards against fraud and perj-
ury. Around this mode (donatio mortis causa) the
requirement of actual delivery is the only substantial
protection, and the courts, should not weaken it by per-
mitting the substitution of convenient and easily
proven devices." Keepers v. Fidelity Co., 56 N. J. L.
302, 28 A. 585 (23 L. R. A. 184), 44 Am. St. Rep. 397.
Mindful of the facility with which, after the alleged
donor is dead, fraudulent claims of ownership may be
founded on pretended gifts of his property asserted to
have been made while he was living, it is but a salutary
precaution which demands explicit and convincing evi-
dence of every element needed to constitute a valid
donation, whether it be a donation inter vivos or mortis
causa. Even then fraudulent claims may prevail, but
the rigid requirement of the clearest proof will at least
diminish the number.'"
In Brooks v. Mitchell," mentioned above, where the
court found a completed gift causa mortis, the donor, realiz-
ing death was imminent, told the donee to take a suitcase,
and the key to the suitcase, from his room, and told the
donee that everything in it but an insurance policy was
hers. She took the suitcase and key to her room, but did
not open it until after the donor died. The only essential
difference between that case and the principal case is that
the donee acted immediately upon the donor's expression
of his intention to give, while here the donee, for what may
be considered as a good reason to the ordinary individual,
refrained from so acting.
The soundness of the result of these two cases might be
said to rest upon the determination of whether delivery is
an essential element of a gift, or merely evidence to support
15 Supra n. 2.
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it. As generally stated, the essential elements of a gift 6
are the intention to give, the delivery of the subject of the
gift, and the acceptance, with the added requirement in gifts
causa mortis that they be made under the inflence of the
donor's belief that his death is imminent (and on the ex-
press or implied condition that it shall take effect only on
the death of the donor). The delivery required is the same
in both gifts inter vivos and causa mortis, as is recited by
the court in the principal case to be the settled Maryland
rule. Acceptance, if not express., will be presumed in the
absence of an express repudiation, as in the case of a de-
livery to a third party." The requirement of the intention
to give has not been relaxed in any jurisdiction and must
always be shown. 8 Where there has been an actual de-
livery, the purpose of that delivery may be shown, and if
there was no intention to give the proprety to the one to
whom it was delivered, there is no gift.9 However, al-
though a clear intention to give is shown, the purpose of
the retention ° by the donor is treated as immaterial (ex-
cept in the case of a declaration of trust) if delivery is taken
to be an essential element to a perfected gift. But, if on
the other hand, delivery were only evidential, the gift could
be established upon the sufficient showing, by other evi-
dence, of the intention to give. The tone of the Maryland
cases seems to predict adherence to the older view of de-
livery as a separate essential element of the gift.
A second phase of the opinion seems to emphasize that
equity will not enforce a gift that fails at law, either on
the theory that it was a transfer in trust, or that it
amounted to a declaration of trust in the intended donor (at
least in the absence of appropriate proof of intention to
create a trust). It is well established law that to make a
transfer in trust the requisites of the law must be met in
getting title to the intended trustee,2' and, as was stated by
the court in the principal case, "it would seem that equity,
in its recognition of trusts and in the enforcement of them,
requires the same formalities in passing of the subject mat-
1 Deeds of gift are not considered in this discussion.
17 28 C. J. 644.
18 Prince De Bearn v. Winans, 111 Md. 434, 74 A. 626 (1909).
19 28 C. J. 627; Hutson v. Hutson, 168 Md. 182, 189, 177 A. 177 (1935).
20 Distinguish the case where the chattel, after delivery to the donee, is
re-delivered to the donor for some purpose not inconsistent with the con-
tinued ownership of the donee. See 28 C. J. 642, Sec. 36d.
1 See Restatement, Trusts, Secs. 17-73. The plaintiff's contention that
she held as trustee for the payment of the debts of the decedent, with
remainder to her is met by the same requirement of delivery as an essential
element.
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ter of the gift as is required at law." While a declaration
of trust may be proved by parol and requires no particular
formality, except for special provisions of the law such as
the Statute of Frauds dealing with land, Maryland has
earlier followed22 what is the weight of authority, that
equity will not find the intention to make a declaration of
trust from the mere attempt to make a gift which fails for
want of delivery. As the court expressed it in Pope v. Safe
Deposit and Trust Co. :23
"In order to establish a declaration of trust by
parol, the trust must be clear and the evidence of it
convincing. There must be an intention to transfer a
present interest to the cestui que trust, and this re-
quirement is not gratified by evidence which merely
shows that the party with title and possession of the
res intended it to belong, after his death, to another."
The possibility of the proof of an oral declaration of
trust has been used as an argument for the relaxation of
the requirement of delivery to perfect a gift at law. For
example, if A, owning a book, says to B, "I hold this book
in trust for you," (which in effect means "I give you the
equitable title") and B goes away leaving the book on A's
table, equity will enforce the gift, as a declaration in trust.24
But if A, owning the book, says to B, "I give you this
book," (which is in effect saying "I give you the equitable
and legal title to this book") and B goes away leaving the
book on the same table, B has nothing that either a court
of law or equity will enforce.2 5 The actual result, then,
appears to be that Where the donor's, intention is actually
to give more, the donee actually gets nothing. A possible
argument on this basis, however, is merely technical. The
more potent argument for relaxation of the requirement
of delivery is that based upon the social value of the more
liberal modern trend of some of the courts.
2 Pennington v. Gittings, 2 G. & J. 208 (1830) ; and Baltimore Retort and
Brick Co. v. Mali, 65 Md. 93, 3 A. 286 (1886).
23 163 Md. 239, 249, 161 A. 404 (1932).
24 Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212, 43 A. 45, 44 L. R. A. 205 (1899),
where the Court held that a valid trust of personal property may be created
by parol declaration that the declarant holds the property as trustee for
another, and such a trust may be enforced In favor of a volunteer. In this
event, the Court says, from the very nature of the transaction there can be
no delivery to the trustee, because he already holds the property.
25 This Is the result of the doctrine of the principal case.
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